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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ORDER 
ISSUED TO AMERICAN B'UYERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
PRODUCERS MUT.UAL INS.UR-
ANCE COMPANY, UTAH CORPQ .. 
RATIONS. 
BRIEF OF· APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
Case No, 
8117 
An1erican Buye:rs Insurance C01npany o.f Utah and 
Producers Mutual Insurance Company of Utah herein-
after designated as appellants, are both rr1utu~l benefit 
associations as such are defined by the statutes of thE>-
State of Utah. This conclusion is cornpelled by virtu(' 
of the introduction and ad1nission in evidence of the 
ceFtificates of authority of the two companies (R. 21-22, 
17 and 42-43 and 60). No evidence to rebut tlui" pnma 
f''.~ie determination was offen~d or iutrodw·P<t at thP 
hearing. Section 31-31-1, U.C.A. 1953 provideR in part: 
"A dul:v certified <'opy or duplicate of ~neh <·Prtlfieate 
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(certificate of authority) shall be prima facie evidence 
that the licensee is a benefit association within the mean-
ing of this chapter." (Material in parenthesis added.) 
Appellant companies are engaged. in the sale of 
mutual benefit association life insurance policies to mem-
bers of th-eir respective associations. The policy holders, 
through a trust agreement, assign their dividends, if 
any, on their life insurance policies. The trustees, in 
accordance with the trust agreement, purchase stock 
for the policy holders in the company designated by the 
trust agreement (R. 50-51). It was by this procedure 
that the securities were sold or offered in connection 
with the sale of insurance. 
The only issue before the Insurance Commission and 
the Department of Business Regulation at the hearing 
below was whether these mutual benefit associations 
could legally offer and sell securities along with and in 
connection with the sale of insurance (R. 18 and 85), 
Appellants both admitted that they were selling securi~ 
ties in conjunction with the sale of their insurance 
policies (R. 25 and 46). 
The appellants were duly licensed to sell securities 
and both companies introduced into the recor~ osrtified 
copies of their "Certificates of Registration~' i~sued by 
the Utah Securities Commission (R. 58, 58a, 58b, 61, 61a 
and 6lb). The sales force of both companies are licensed 
both as insurance agents and sec~rities salesmen (R. 32 
and 50)., 
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Counsel for the Statf' of Uta.li stipulated that there 
was ''no question involved in this matter of solvency of 
these firms." (R. 114-115). 
After the conclusion of the hearing before the Insur. 
ance Commission and the Department of Business Regu-
lation, an or-d~r was entered directing the appellants to 
cease and deFiist witlun ten days, "from. selling, offering 
or promising to give, or allowing in any manner whatso-
ever any shares of stoek or other securities issued or at 
any time to be issued or any interests OJ" rights therein 
in connection with or as an inducement to the purchase· 
of any insurance or insurance type benefit." (R. k7). 
Thereafter an appeal was taken to the District 
Court where by stipulation (R .. 127) all partie~ agreed to 
submit the matter to the Di8triC't Court for determina-
tion upon the record made in the hearing before thP 
Department of Business Regulation and thf' InsurancP 
Commission. Thereafter the District Court by ttf' order 
duly entered affirmed the above order of the Department 
of Business Regulation and the InsurancP Comrnission 
(R. 155). This appeal is taken from. the order of the 
District Court. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR 
The order of the Department of Business Regula-
tion and the lmmrance Commission of the State::~ of Ptah 
is in error in the following particulars: 
(a) The Deparbnent of Bnsine~8 1-{egulation, tht-· 
Insurance Department of the State of L t.ah and thf' 
Distric-t Court. as a matter of law erronf'ou:-;1 y concl ucJ._, 
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that petitioners are insurerH and persons as defined by 
the Insurance Code of the State of Ulah, and thereforP 
they are subject to the general in~urance code. 
(b) The Department of Business Regulation) th"" 
Insurance Department of the State of Utah and the 
District Court erroneously conclude that pf>t1tioners arp 
bound by Section 31-27-15 and 31-717, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
(c) The Department of Busine~s Regulation, thP 
Insurance Department of the. State of Utah and thP 
District Court have failed to recognize the special treat-
ment to which petitioners are entitled by reason of hold-
ing certificates of authority to engage in the in~urance 
business as Mutual Benefit Associations. 
(d) The Department of Business Regulation, the 
Insurance Department of the Statt- of Tltah and tht> 
District Court have totally disregarded Chapter 31, Ptab 
Code Annotated 1953, and in particular Sections 31-1-14 
and 31-31-15 thereof 
(e) The Department of Business Regulation, the 
Insurance Department of the State of Utah and the 
District Court have disregarded pertinent. and control-
ling decisions by the Utah and Supreme Courts of other 
States. 
(f) The sale of seeurities by petitioner~ in conjunc-
tion or in connection with the· sale of insurance han been 
theretofore considered and approved by the Insurance 
Corrunission and had by petitioners been carried on for 
.in excess of two years, with the full knowledg~ and 
approval of thP ln~urancP Commi~sion. 
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(g) Said Order t~ void, arbitrary and capricious 
and without any support or foundation in the record o.t 
at law, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS ARE MUTUAL BENEFIT 
ASSOCIA_TIONS. 
On the present state of the record it must bP con-
ceded that appellants are mutual benefit associations 
as such are defined by the Statutes of the State of Utah. 
This conclusion is compelled by virtue of the introdue-
tion and admittance in evidence of the certificates of 
authority of the two cmnpanies and the fact that no other 
evidence in rebuttal of this prima facie determination 
was introduced at the hearing. See 31-31-l, UCA 1953. 
See also, State v Royal N eighborr;; of Arnerica,, 44 
New Mexico 8, 96 P. 2d 705 (New Mexico 1939), At Page 
709 the Court diseusses the effeet of a duly eertified eopy 
or duplicate of the license as proof that the company 
was a fraternal benefit society. In fact the Court went 
far beyond anything necessary to these appellantf- in 
establishing their status. The New Mexico Court went 
so far as to hold that when the particular company 
involved was l]censed as a fraternal henefit society ib 
status was irrevocably established for the particular 
period involved. 
The record in this ease establislH:':-: t h.., fac1 .. w1thnt11 
eontradiction, that appellants are m;ut~u,al bwne{lt assor:uJ, 
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tio1't.S, which associations are authorizPd to wnt~:> varwu8 
kinds of insurance. The first sentence of Section 31-31-
10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, refers to "contracts of 
life insurance" issued by these assomations, Rection 
31-31-11 limits the "amount of insurance" risk which 
these associations may assume. Thus appellants are by 
statute special kind~ of companieH or association~ 
engaged in writing limited policies of insuranc~. The 
faet that they are incorporated, and th~ fact that thPy 
are successful[;y writing insurance for the mnnben nf 
the association does not alter tbeir ~tatutory natnr~. 
They are still m1tt'ual benefit associations, 
THERE REl\IAIN~ FOB. DISGGSSION, THEN, 
THE SOLE QlTESTION AS TO WHF.THER. IT J~ 
[LLEGAL FOR APPELLANTS, AS MUTUAL BENE-
FIT ASSOCIATIONS, TO SELL SECURITIES IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE lSSUA:\CE OF' POLl 
CIES O.W LIFE INR.URANCE 
II 
.MUTUAL BENEFIT AS-SOCIATIONS ARE 
EXEMPT FROl\1 THE GENERAL 
INSURANCE CODE. 
Prohibition against seeurity sales in connedJOlJ with 
insurance sales is elaimed by the Attorney Gew:.ral'::; 
Office by reason of Sec.tions 31-717 and 31-27-1~>. T:CA 
1953, and also by reason of the Supreme Court of Utah 
decision in the case of Utah Associaf1on of L1ff' Under-
Jrriter.s v. ]J1ounta?m· State . .;; Life ln.surance. Co ;,~ [tah 
579. 200 P. 67:3. 
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Conver~ely, appellants da~rn ~xempt.~«JIJ_ il'om th~ 
OeneraJ Insurance Law~ of the state, and particular!) 
the above cited section~, by reason of 31-:~1-15 UCA 1953, 
which read~ as follows 
''Exemptions from other proVIsions of code. 
-Except as provided in tbiEo chapter, every such 
association shall not be subject to the other pro-
visions of th1s code unless the context elear]y 
indicates applicability to such association.'' 
Appellants urge to thi~ Commission the applica-
bility and determinativeness of tht' deciswn by the Utah 
Rupreme Court in the ea~P of Rrodduck, by Srrt.ith v. 
Paczfic Woodmen. Life Associ.atunt., 89 Utah 7;), ;)-1: p_ 2d 
1189. In this case the plmntiff ~ued a~ benefwiary of a 
eertifieatP of fraternal benefit insurantl-- issued on th~ 
life of his father. The defendant association denied 
liability on the ground that eertain :'tatt->nwnb ntade b) 
the assured in his application for immrance were war-
ranties and since they were untrue they thereby voided 
the policy'. By General Insurance ~tat~t(-' of the Stat(-' 
of rtah it is provided that the policy ~hall <'Onstitutp thp 
entire contract between thP parties and that all state-
ments made by the insured shall, in tht- ah~encf' of 
fraud, be deemed representations and not warrant1~:-. 
The defendant association contended that inasmuch a:--
it was a fraternal benefit association it was therefon· 
not subject to the General Insurance Laws. The Suprenw 
Court held for the defendant. assof~iation> stating that 
by reason of Revised Statutes 1933, 4:~-9-4, 4~i-l-l, fra-
ternal benefit societies were not sub.Jt>C1 to the general 
provisions of the Insurance CodY. 
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Appellants earnestly submit that while in the Pacific 
Woodmen case the company involved was a fraternal 
organizati?n, as distinguished from appellants who are 
mutual benefit associations, still the legal proposition 1::: 
th~ same. Both classes of organizations enjoy a statutorJ 
exemption from the General Insurance Laws of Utah. 
There is no, reason for this Court to make a distinction 
between a fraternal organization and awy other type of 
exempted organization by hono,ring one exemption a;n.d 
disallowing the other. 
Indeed the cases have not made any such distinction, 
as evidenced by the fact that exemption has been granted 
to the following~ 
See State Ex Rel Cor~Jner, Attorn.ey Generalv. West. 
ern Mutual Benefit Association, 47 Idaho 360, 276 P. 37 
(Idaho 1929). In this case the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the Western Mutual Benefit Association wai' 
exempt from thP General Insurance Statutes of the ~tate 
of Idaho, despite the fact that the company did not have 
a representative form of government; that it wasn't 
governed by the lodge system; that it did not have an 
initiation or ritualistic form of work; and that the bene-
fits it paid were not confined to a limited class of per-
sons. The Court held this company to be a benevolent 
order or society, which, under the laws of Idaho, was 
granted an exemption from the General Insurance Code. 
See also, Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Westover, 99 
Colo. 231, 61 P. 2d 585 (Colorado 1936). In this case 
the Colorado Supreme Court held thai the company was 
a fraternal society operating on the lodge plan, and that. 
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1t. had. tH-·~n adm.itteci tc' do hu;0;ines~ in Coh>ra.d{' a~ n_ 
fraternal benevolent society, TliP General Insurance 
Laws of tlie State provided that the suicide of a policy-
holder after the fin;t. year should not be a defense against 
the payment of a policy. This general provision relating 
to suieide was directed by the tenns of the statute to 
the policies of "any life insurance company." 'rhere wa~ 
a proVIsiOn in the general Colorado Insurance Statut~:-. 
as fol1ows · 
''This aet shall not apply to fraterna! benefit 
~ociPtiP~ al' defined tn Cha~lt.f•l J311 ol u ..... law:-. 
passed at tlie 18th Besswn of tht- Oeneral A~~ ... ~m­
bly of tbt> State of Colorado~. PXCPpt a~ thr· rein 
otherwise expressly provided.,. 
The Court held that it was the consi~tPnt intention of tbP 
legislature to exempt fraternal benefit ~o(•tetie~ fron1 t h~-> 
operation of thP general insurance law~ of the statt~. 
See also, Na.tionoJ A1d L1jij Assotiatt.on 11 Abbott, 
17V. Okla. 319, 62 P. 2d 982 (Okla. 1936). Th1s ca::w 
involved a mu.tual benefit r·ompwny Th1- qttP~tion beforE" 
the Court was whether the General T llf;Urane.e Laws of 
the State of Oklabon1a applied to th1~ t~Tpe of eon1pany 
The Court cited prior de(~isions with rPsped to fraternal 
benefit ~ociHiP~ wherein the C()nri had held that hy 
virtue of thE' intention of the legislature tht'~P eompaniP~ 
were exmpt from tlw genera] im·mranef-' law~~ and thPn 
said: 
"The Fraternal Benefit Act and thP ;\1_utual 
Benefit Aet are of such eharacter that wp havP 
no hP~itane~, m applying- t.he ea~f· of Natwnal 
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Benevolent Society v. Russell insofar as it affects 
Section 10-519." (This section has to do with the 
operations of mutual benefit companies.) 
Thus the Court held that the mutual benefit company 
was not subject to the general insurance laws of the state. 
See also, Fidelity Life Association v, Hobbs, 161 
Kansas 163, 166 P. 2d 1001 (Kansas 1946), In this case 
the Kansas Supreme Court held that it was the intent 
and purpose of the legislature to place fraternal benefit 
societies in a class by themselves, make them amenable 
to conditions, and subject them to regulatory powers and 
supervision different from those of insurance companiPi' 
in general. See particularly the discussion at 166 Pac., 
2d., Page 1006. 
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the 
rnutual benefit associations are not the only organiza-
tions granted exemptions under the Utah Insurance Code. 
[n this regard note the following sections under UCA 
1953: 
31-32-23 applicable to cooperatives. 
31-21-18 applicable to mutual fire companies. 
31-30-3 applicable to hospital service plan. 
31-29-4 applicable to fraternal benefit associa 
tions. 
It is worthy of note that even though cooperative 
associations are granted the exemption by the section 
above cited, still by Section 31-32-22, UCA 1953, srud 
cooperative associations, their officers, directors, agents 
and employees are subject to all the provisions of Chap-
ter 27 of the Code, and Chapter 27, of course. contams 
one of the prohibition sections upon which thP Attorney 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
General places reliance, There i6 no refer~nce anywhen: 
in the chapter of the code relating to mutual benefit 
asso'Ciatio'Yls which requires that said associations comply 
with Chapter 270 
If the Attorney General's contention is sound that 
the legislature intended these unusual organizations and 
associations to be bound by the general regulatory pro-
visions of the Insurance Code, why, then, did the legis-
lature specifically enact Section 31-32-22, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 ~ Certainly the fact that the legislature 
specifically directed that cooperative insurance com-
panies must comply with all of the provisions of Chapter 
27 of the Insurance Code must have indicated that with-
out this specific mandate these companies would not have 
been subject to this chapter of the Code. 
In connection with these various statutory exemp . 
tioris particular attention is called to Section 31-1-14 
UCA 1953, which reads a~ fol1ows: 
"Construction of code--Particular paramount 
over generaL-Provisions of this eode r·elating to 
a particular kind of insurance or a particular type 
of insure-r prevail over- provisions relating to in-
surance in general or insurers in general." 
Now let us discuss Section 31-31-1, wherein lt lS 
stated: 
"]~very association (nmtua] benefit aHsocia-
tion)* * * which desires to do ~mch a bu~ine~t-' in 
this State shall comply with all the requirernent~ 
and provisions of this chapter, and r he Gene raJ 
Insurance Laws of Utah relative to -;aid a.r...·soc~o­
tion * * *." (Italics added.) 
11 
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The Attorney General apparently wi~he~ this Court to 
ignore the meaning of the word "relative." ~hh:; word 
cannot be ignored since to do so requires the interpreter 
to completely disregard and wipe out the effect uf 31-
31-15. Acceptance of the word "relative" in the context 
in which it is used results however in a reasonablP 
' ' interpretation of the two sections, and this is amply ~mp-
ported by the case law on the subject, that each statut~ 
is to be construed so that the whole is tnade hannonious. 
Scrutinizing the various legislative enactments also 
furnishes some light on this matter. Initially the mutual 
benefit insurance- section. first appeared in lb~ Code iJ. 
1935. It. should be observed that at the dat.t-C of df'(~Js(on -rr~ 
the M oum.tain,. 8 tate..'; Life I rbSurance Co'rnpo;ny case ( 1921) i 
which is heavily relied upon by the Attorney General, 
there were no statutory provisions for mutual benefit 
associations in the State of Utah. Furthermon\ the· 
Mountain States Life Insurance Company was not a 
domestic mutual benefit association and did not clau11 
to be. Thus, since the statutes before the. Court in that 
decision were entirely different from those now on the 
books in the State of Utah, and since subsequent to the 
decision by the Utah Supreme Court in ihat ease th~ 
legislature saw fit to amend the insuranee law~ exten-
sively~ we feel that the case has n.o bearing al aU 01'~­
rnu,tual benefit associat£on companies, Let us enlarge 
upon these statutory changes referred to in the preced-
Jng sentence. 
As before stated, Laws of TTtah 1935, Chapter 41, 
Ranctioned mutual benefit associations. [n 1941 the legis-
12 
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latur~-: enacted Section 43-ll~lj (i). wherein mutual bene= 
fit associations were specifically prohibited from offer~ 
ing, giving, or selling securities in conjunction with the 
sale of insuranceo At that precise time the Insurance 
Code definition of "insurance company" included "all 
corporations, associations, partnerships and individuals 
engaged as principals in the insurance business, ·except-
ing fraternal and benevolent orders and societies/' 43-
l-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943), Also at that same time 
'insurance companies" were then prohibited from offer-
ing, giving or selling securities in conjunction with the 
sale of insurance by virtue of the general prohibition 
found in Section 43-3-33 and 34, lJtah Code Annotated 
1943. Nevertheless the legislature in 1941 enacted the 
special prohibition found in Section 43-11-13 (i) men-
tioned above. 
By the Laws of r tah 194 7, not only was Section 
13(i), Chapter 44, Laws of 1941 (the section prohibiting 
mutual benefit companies from selling securities in con~ 
junction with insurance) removed, but. there was added 
the exemption section, 43-31-15, Utah· Code Annotated 
1943, Pocket Parts, which section has been retained and 
carried forward from that date to the present, where it 
now appears as Section 31-31-15, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. So we have a legislative history wherein nmtual 
benefit associations were in 1941 expressly subjected to 
the prohibition against selling stock in conjunction with 
the issuance of life insurance policies, and a ~nb~~ttuPnt 
removal of that specific prohibition from th(" d1u1 •t.P.r per-
taining to mutual benefit associations. Conc111 n-·ntly wttll 
the removal of the prohibition Wf-' find th..- legislaturf> 
lB 
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enacting for the first time the section exempting mutual 
benefit associations from the General Insurance Code. 
It cannot be supposed that the legislature's action8 w~re 
meaningless. The mandate of the legislature seems plain 
and unambiguous; namely, that these mutual benefit 
associations shall not be subject to the other provisions 
of the Code unless the context clearly indicates wpplt-
cability to such assO'ciatiovn. 
The Attorney General argued below that since the 
appellants were engaged in the assumption of insurance 
nsks, and were "persons'' as defined in the general insur" 
ance Code that they were necessarily therefore subject 
to the entire insurance code. Appellant companies do 
not deny that ·they are engaged in the assumption of 
insurance risks, nor do they deny that technically they 
are "persons'' as defined in Section 31-1-9, ITtah Code 
Annotated 1953. But they do point out that mutual bene-
fit associations are not subject to the other provisions 
of the Insuranc~ Code, unless the context. clearly indi-
cates applicability to such association. If by virtue, 
alone, of the broad definition of "person" and "insurer" 
these associations are to be brought under section 31-27 
15 Utah Code Annotated 1953, then by the same token 
each and every section and chapter of the general Insur-
ance Code would likewise apply to these respondents. 
This follows because all parts of the general Insurance 
Code, without exception, apply to and govern either 
"persons" or 'insur~rs." Such a construction would 
therefore completely nullify and wipe out the language 
of section 31-31-15, exempting these companies from the 
rernaining provisions of the Code. That such a construe-
14 I 
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twn was never intended by the legislature l.k manifest 
Our own Supreme Court. very clearly recites the rule 
whichgoverns a case such as this in Board of Education~ 
,_i. Bryner, 57 Utah '78, 192 Pac" 627, at 629 (Utah 1920), 
Our Supreme Court there said; 
"It follows that in order to deterntine thl='· 
intention and purpose of the lawmaker, and io 
harmonize conflicting provisions where such 
occur~ it at times becomes necessary for' the courts 
t.o expand or to restrict the ordinary and usual 
meaning of words, phrases, or clauses fonnd in 
a particular section or statute~ In that connection. 
it is also neces~::~ary to observe thP cardinal rulP' 
of construction that every word and phrase rnu~t 
be given some force and effect ]f possible, and 
this notwithstanding the fa(•.t that in doi.ng. ~o the 
effect of the particular section or statute may 
t:hereby be enlarged or restricted as the case may 
be. When, therefore, the language of a ::;ef'.tJon or 
statute is ambiguous and doubtful, and on reading 
the language there ls douht whether it ~hould bt<:· 
applied in accordance with its ordtnary and usual 
meaning or whether it should reeetv~ an enlarged 
or restricted construction and effect, it i~ the duty 
of the courts t:o looks beyond the statutP if by 
doing ~o they can better determine th~ intPntwn 
and purpose of the laWinakers. ~Ion~ovet, a.~ a, 
meanS Of :tSCertatning the trUe intention Of tJ1P 
laWlnakers, it may also be rt-ecessa.ry to i:nq,,~_fir<-' 
into and sca;n the history of the pa~rtic1dar 8la.tu.tt-
im, question, mnd ~n .. connectio11, therewith CO'~''"''''d (·.·r· 
the ,general purpose of the lawmakers i-n fo-r'l'tt'Ulo 
tilng and passing law.s 'l4rp01'~· a p·artic·ula-r· s·ubJPrf 
and that is particularly true in .. cases 'Where. d·rf 
ferent sections or provision.~ rela .. tinp to the sam"f, 
S1J,bject-matter are conflictmg or am,hi_qu,o·us '' 
15 
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The legislative history of this prohibition against 
selling securities with insurance has already been recited 
in this brief. However as conclusive evidence that the 
legislature itself is not in accord with the position that 
mutual benefit associations are, merely because they are 
"insurers", subject to the general insurance code pro-
visions governing insurers, we call attention to section 
31-31-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This section specifi-
cally requires that agents of mutual benefit association~ 
must be licensed pursuant to Chapter 17 of the Insurance 
Code. An examination o~ Chapter 17 readily discloses 
that all persons authorized by an ''insurer" to solicit. 
applications for insurance are agents, who must be 
licensed by the Commission. Thus, if the attorney gen-
eral's argument is sound, all agents of mutual benefit 
associations were required to be licensed by virtue of 
the provisions of Chapter 17. The legislature, however, 
did not believe this to be true, as they enacted a specific 
section applying to agents of mutual benefit associations. 
Again we must conclude that there was a reason for the 
enactnwnt of Section 31-31-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. The obvious reason was that without the enact-
ment of this section, the legislature had concluded that 
agents of mutual benefit associations would not be re-
quired to be licensed by the Insurance Commission. 
We submit that this legislative history compels the 
conclusion that by repealing Section 43-11-13 (i), U.C.A. 
1943, and at the same time granting mutual benefit asso~ 
ciations an exemption fron1 the general Insurance CodP 
16 
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(31-31~1f). Utah Code Annotated 1953). left these com·-
panie~ free to offer) seek~ or give securiti~--~ in eonjunction 
w 1th lht> ~altt of .:.nsnrarwe 
Almost immediately after the legislature, in 194 7 
deleted the prohibitiOn against the sale of stock in con-
junction with the sale of insurance frorn the mutual 
benefit association chapter of the Code~ the Insurance 
Department was called upon to n1akf; a contemporaneous 
ruling,. As the Insurance Commission well knew certifi 
cates of authority were issued to appellant mutual bent> 
fit associations and their policie~ were approv~d by the 
Insurance Department. At th~ same time, the Business 
Regulations Cmnmission, through Jts S.-.euntles Divis10n 
and the Jnsuran(~e Divu~:wn, wa:- fully awar~ qf the faf't 
that appellant mutual hrm~fit a~~oc•Jatlon:.; werf' offering 
gtock in (~OnJunction with the ~ale of thP-n insurancf-" 
policies-. ThiB IS all a. 1natter of public rPcord tn tht" 
Insurance Comnn~sH,n The law book~ ar~-> full of ('asP~ 
holding that the pra(~twal 1 nt1--rprnat10n~ by th~-' depart. 
ment of government charg-eri with the udm.mi:-:tratwn or 
enforcement of a parti<>:rllar law ar~· Pnt:Itlxd to th~-" 
highest respect from thP c·,··u rlK Thl~ ruil=' ~~ part WlJ 
larly tnw when th.-. arlrnim~trahvP determ1natwn (;:-.; con--
temporaneou~ with tlu-· fir~t working 1)f tb ... 8tat•JtP 
There ar<:> sound rPa::-;on8 why thP Court~ giVf-'. such gn--at 
weight to thesf' praetieaJ eonternpnraneous rulings ol (:1 n 
administrative body. They have been reeited as follow~ 
1. The respect due the adn1inistrativf' authority. 
2. The officerl" concerned are usually abh, men and 
masters of the subje<>t 
17 
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3. The same men are frequently the draften~ of th~ 
law they are called upon to interpret. 
The officials of the Insurance. Commission that 
approved the activities of appellants for the past several 
years were just such men as described above. If the 
Courts attach such great weight and significance to 
administrative rulings because of the foregoing reasons, 
how much more appropriate it would seern that the Insur-
ance Commission should have attached the same weight 
br,, 1ts own previous rulings and determinations, particu-
larly in view of the legislation which is now on the book~ 
and the legislative history already set forth in this brief. 
For a complete discussion of this rule of law, that public 
administrative rulings are entitled to weight, see 42 Am. 
Jur., Page 392, et seq. See also, Decker v. New York 
Life Insurance Company, 94 Utah 166, 76 P. 2d 568, at 
572. Surely this Court will now honor this established 
rule of law. 
Another factor which should not be overlooked in 
consideration of this problem is that the Utah Supreme 
Court, as long ago as 1894 in the case of DOJmiher v. 
Grand Lodge A.O.U. W., 37 P. 245, ruled that a fraternal 
eompany doing general insurance business in the State 
of Utah would have its policies construed and deter-
mined by the general law applicable to mutual life insur-
ance corporations. Subsequent to this early decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court the legislature saw fit to step 
in and modify the ruling in the Daniher case. Thus our 
legislature has specifically provided that several kinds 
of associations are exempt from the General Insurance 
18 
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Laws, We must presmne that the legislature was fully 
aware of the Utah decision in the Daniher case and that 
their subsequent exemptions granted to these various 
groups and associations was so that the Daniher decision 
would not continue to be the law of the state. 
During the course of the oral argument below the 
Attorney General and counsel for the intervening hff' 
underwriters remarked that appellants were in effect 
attempting to en~joy complete irrununity from all thf', 
insurance laws of the ~tate which placed thP, appellant.~ 
in a much more favorable position than oiher companies 
writing ~imilar Insurance. We respectfully direct the 
Court's attention to the fact that any ~uch immunity .i~ 
narrow and well defined. and moreover mer~ly qualify 
1ng for. the imrnunity plar~es r·Prtai n burden~ and lunita.-
tions upon thoi5P organizati()ns ~o qualifying., and als<1 
upon the agent~. officPrs. and i-:'ruployef>::-. that work fm 
them 
The appellants must cornply with tbf' provisww- of 
Chapter :)1, which, anwng other tlnng~. providt- that H 
minimum. of 300 person~ must hav~ applied 1 n writ1n12 
to said association for member~hip and ben~f1t~ therPin. 
or at lra~t $200,000 of m~un:trlt~t- bf'n~~flt~-- wn~t have tn.,~->1 
applied for_ Also. a hond in thf' penal ~urn of $~,001) 
must be t>xeeuted and (•f'rtai n r0gu;;tration and examrn;.}-
tion fees must be paid dependent upon the number of 
members or insurance in force" Chapter ~1 also place~ 
a limit of $3,000 on any one risk that a beneflt association 
may assume, and amounts in excess thereof are only 
permitted by reason of reinsurance, Pl(·. These are all 
19 
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limitations that are applicable to tuutua.l bt-mefll a~l"oe.w­
tions as distinguishPd from legal I'P~~rvt-> life insu ran~P 
eompanies. 
There is nothing new or novel in creating what at. 
first blush appears to be advantageous position~ for 
designated and well defined organizations. As hereto-
fore noted, the Utah Insurance Code itself, in addition 
to mutual benefit associations, sets up many different 
types of organizations, namely fraternal benefit, coopera-
tives, mutua] fire companies, etc. Without fear of con-
tradiction, appellants believe it can safely be -stated that 
every state in the union, to a greater or lesser degree, 
has substantially identical legislation. Perhaps t~e Utah 
legislature granted these exemptions in an effort to 
stimulate the organization and growth of loca] eompanie~ 
whose capital and surplus would ren1ain m thP ~tate and 
aid our economic growth. _Whatever the reason, the 
legislature has granted these exemptions. 
Nor are these exempting statutes confined to state~ 
alone as witness the advantageous federal tax treatment 
accorded to charity institutions, insurance companies~ 
cooperatives, and building and loan societies to enmp-
Prate a few. All such organizations enjoy what may 
appear to be definite advantage~, yet, all art> properly 
excluded and exempted provided they have complied 
with the statutory definitions authorizing their existence. 
These statutory enactments are, of course, m.any and 
varied, and the restrictions and limitations therein con-
tained must be complied with or the apparently favored 
position will be lost. But who can say whether such a 
20 
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position ~~ in. truth ''favored''. Perhaps rnerely compli--
ance with the statutes involved is suffieiently onerou~ 
so that. others will not choose to be bound. To permit 
the mutual benefit associations 1 n compete or actually 
to exist, the legislature n1ay deem it necessary to exelude 
them. and other similarly situated organizations from 
certain general provisions of the law. If it is found that. 
the exclusion or exemption is too broad, the cure for thi~ 
condition must be accornplished through artion of the 
legislature. An excellent exarnpl~ of the curtailment of 
a once granted exernption n1ay be found in the com-
paratively recent action of the Congress of tJ,e ·united 
States so far as the ta."{atwn of cooperatives and HavingR 
and loan companies are concerned. 
During the argt.unent before the In8uraw~t> Commi~­
swn and the District Court the Attorney General and 
the attorney for tht- intervenor eompanif>:- inferrAd that 
tlH .. re was something inherently wrong or f-'Vll eonneeterl 
with appellants sales activities and operations In thf. 
first place, then~ i~ nothing in thi~ .record to justify arry 
such inferenceH. There is nu qtw:'\tion of ~olvenc~· of 
appellant eornpani.es ( R ll~-11;>) involved in th1~ case 
The proeedurp fntlo"ved by hoth <•ompanit::>~ is almost 
identical \\'ith that ~Pt forth in the ea~e of Comme·rcwl 
Life lnsnrnnce ('omfHlYII/..J r J;Vnyht. 6-l Arizona 129, :t f)h 
Pac. (2d) 943 (Arizona Hl46). \\'p quotP frorn t!n:::; <~a::..;p 
at page 950-951 " 
!~I!.!;.. c,or.sidering the. efft:'et of the agreen1en\ 
resort to the following general prineiples of law 
is not only helpful but determinative of the issues 
herein. These general princ1ples are: 
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" 'It Inay be laid down a~ a broad generaJ 
rule that the right to receive money du~ or to 
become due under a contract may be assigned, 
even though the contract itself may not be assign-
able. * * *' 4 Am. Jur., Assignments, section 14. 
H '* * * an assignment of a debt not yet due 
and which may never becom(l due is effective if 
it appears that there is an existing contract or 
employment out of which the debt 1nay arise, * • 
*.' 2 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, 
page ll83. 
" 'Except as stated in section 151, a right 
expected to arise in the future, under a contract 
or employment in existence at the tin1e of the 
assignment, can be effectively assigned.' 1 Re-
statement of the Law, Contracts, vol. 1 sec. 154. 
" 'It has been held that * * * dividends belong 
solely to the insured and Inay be secured by hil:' 
creditors. * * *' 2 Appleman on Tnsuranc~ Law 
and Practice~ sel'o 1345, pagi B01:i _ 
"The trust agreement i~ without taint of 
illegality. It is an agreement by which oertain 
trustors, being policyholders in Cmnmercial Bene-
fit, and being entitled by virtue of their policies 
to share in any dividends which may be declared 
by Commercial Benefit, assign such future divi-
dends, as they become payable, to the bank and 
agree that when a sufficient trust fund exists they 
will accept, in return therefor, the capital stock 
of petitioner. The agreement is made upon a. suf-
ficient consideration, and without doubt the holder 
of an ·insurance policy may assign to another the 
money to become due under the terms of the insur-
ance contract, whether by dividend or otherwise. 
"We do not believe that there is any merit 
to the contention of the Attorney General that 
22 
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tl1P benefit company by accepting- assignment~ 
would be engaging in a.ny illegal act, not JfO,par 
d1zing tts assets to the inJury of it~ certificatf:' 
holders. The benefit company does not agree with 
the Commercial Life to deliver to the trustee th~:<. 
surplus dividend from tts mortuary fund, Th~ 
9enefit company mereJy consents to the assign-
ment by such of its policyholders a~ may choosf~ 
to executr. the trust agreement, and agreed tf• 
pay their div1dends to the tr·ustee Thr~ Corpora-
twn Commission ha~ complete. pnwu t•, :-;~t that 
benefit eorporations charge proper premiums for 
benefit certificates issued and create nut of pre-. 
miums paid mortuary and r~serve fund::- ~uffJ. 
•::it-':n1 tu pavhenefitdaim~ and g·f'twra~ ••f't"l"liltn_u: 
expenses,'' 
Wf> emphasize that in thP, case now hPfor~-> th.t~ Court~ 
tht-r-f' ts likewise no taint of illegality,. 1 n~olvPncy, or 
injury to the public~ involved There t~ onf' and . ·nly 
one question before thP eourt and that l~, a r·~ appellant 
eompan1es ~-'Xt>mpt frow SediOn8 :H 21 1 :J and :31 7-17 ., 
U C.A. 1953. ] t is not pr·oper for th :.:-- Cuurt tf, perrnrt 
th~ Insurance ConnnJ;;;~Joner to detPrnn;lf '-'·hat 1~ w ''d. 
and bad, and what is in thf-· 1nt~:>n-·:-.t of (•r>na111 e1)frr· 
~ panie~ and thr general publw, That t:-. a f"urt<'i.!un of th.., 
legislature alone 
('<)~(~Lr_;siON 
fr, (~oncluswn, we should hiH' to 1·itf· two l·a:--1·~ .. vhlCh 
we believe dearly show the pr-oper rulf~ m a rrmt.ter of 
thi::- kind. 
Tn Stat~ ' Ro:tJaf /'v'p_1ghho·r, of A'rntrica,, 4+ ~~, l\L ~-
96 P 2d 7051 ;j t l'ap;e 709 ( l'\ PW l\J ex11 ... 19:~9) tht:> Cour~. 
makes thl~ vPry pertinent ~-d.<:~tPmer, f,.: 
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"It may be that the line of dentarcatwn bP-
tween the character of policy written by the old 
line insurance companies and fraternal benefit 
societies has become less distinct as the years haw~ 
passed and the business of insuring the lives of 
its members has become the major purpose of, 
and largely the justification for, the existence of 
fraternal benefit societies. It may be true that 
the state, by legislation that sets these defendants 
apart from the field of insurance companies 
generally, has failed to sense what plaintiff so 
ably urges to be a fact, viz., that such societies 
no longer substantially perform functions of 
genuine fraternal societies; that they are not 
organizations with subordinate lodges where ar.-. 
taught ~nd exemplified lessons of fraternal 
brotherhood, charity, morality, good citizenship 
and other kindred subjects. It may be true that 
today less attention is given to the ritualistic and 
fraternalistic work espoused by the lodge and 
more to the solicitation of insurance anwng the 
membership; and yet, admission of these facts 
would still not favor a different status for defend-
ants. 
"Paraphrasing somewhat the language used 
by the Arkansas court in the case of Modern 
Woodmen of America vs. State, supra: 'It may be 
true that these societies have in a large measure 
departed from their original purpose of much 
fraternalism and small benefits for that of small 
fraternalism and large benefits, and that they 
have taken on many of the characteristics of old 
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h n~, 1 nsurance t~ompani·~:-; > 'But, .it has substan-
tially complied with the statutes of th.is state>' 
thP court went on to say, 'and whether it may con-
hnue to operate as a fraternal beneficiary society 
m this state presents a question addressed to thP 
general assembly and not to us.' 
''The legislaturP has provided for adrnisswn 
into this state and license for such fraterrial bene--
fit societies. The definition WP accept did not 
always have legislative sanction; hut, regardles:;. 
of that fact, both before and after the enactment. 
of the fraternal code of 1921, thP determtnation 
of the status of defendant~ b:v the Superintendent 
of Insurance~ the one agrnty legally authorized 
by statute t(l waki-"; ~nd: d_tterminati('n~ he(~arne 
finaL Any question a~ to the wt~dorn of ~etting 
up by legislation the di~tmdwn thu~ made 1~ nor 
for the eourh;. '' 
h ~hould. be noted tha1 tbt~ c:a~e mv1.lve~ tht' very type ot 
pn,blem which IS bPfOrt> this Court, that L~, whether a. 
fraternal benefit ~ociety ~~ su h.w<·.t to the g·en'"' r-aJ insur 
ance h;l\v~ of tlw state 
The other case to which we refer Ii-i F'ideli.ty L'iff> 
Association v Hobb.s, lnl Kansa~ 163, 166 P, 2d 1001 
(Kansas 1946) Agam thi~ t:-; a case Involving the precis~ 
pOint of law present before thu~ Coqrt~ that i~, whether. 
the genera] 1nsuranc(:> law~ of thP statf' ::~pply to an 
exem_pted association, Lf:>t Ut-' quote fn·rn tlti.,- dP<·.tsion r:~J 
Pag-~ 1006. 
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"'However, we are equally mindful of otht-or 
Legal principles applicable to the commissioner of 
insurance which are just as fundamental, if not 
more so, as the ones to which we have last rP-
ferred and are so elemental as to require no cita-
tion of authorities. One is that the Legislature 
makes the law and that its fiats must be observed 
by him. Another is that the statute is the source 
of his power and all of his acts must be within 
the limits of the authority it confers upon him. 
Still another is that it is the province of the courts 
to construe the statute and, when called upon to 
do so, determine the scope of his official author-
ity. And lastly, another is that it is not for th(:' 
<~ourts to substitute their judgment for that of 
the Legislature but to give its enactments the 
force and effect the language found there111 
requires. 
"That it was the intent and purpose ot the 
Legislature to place fraternal benefit societiP~ in 
a class by themselves, make them amenable to 
conditions and subject the1n to regulatory powers 
and supervision different from those of insurance 
companies in general cannot be a subject of doubt 
when 40-201, to which ~we have already referred, 
is carefully read and critically analyzed." 
Thus, we would suggest that whether mutual benefit 
aRsociations are to be permitted to sell stock in conjunc-
tion with or in connection with the sale of insurance is 
a question which has been determined for the present 
h,· the legislature. If there are those who believe that 
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thi8 policy is in error, t.ht:} remedy is legislative-not 
judiciaL Those who would tl•t->refore invoke a prohibition 
against the sale of stock in conjunction with the salt 
of insurance by mutual benefit associations should be 
directed by this Court to take their problem to the legis-
lature as the state of the laws at. present clearly indicates 
the controHing policy now in effect 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MlJLLINER 
By SEATON PRINCE 
Counsel for .American Buyer~ 
Insurance Company of Utah 
RICH, ELTON_& MANGUM 
By MAX K. MANGUM 
Counsel for Producers 
Mutual Ins. Co. of 1Jta.h 
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